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Abstract 
In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis 
as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the 
cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cogni-
tive argument for cost-benefit analysis’ and finds it wanting. Once we make distinctions 
between different cognitive errors and between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis, it 
becomes apparent that there are really two cognitive arguments, neither of which is success-
ful as arguments for cost-benefit analysis as a whole. One argument shows that the analysis 
aspect of cost-benefit analysis is warranted because it corrects for false beliefs about the 
magnitudes of risk and for the neglect of some costs. While this is a sound argument, it does 
not provide an argument for other aspects of cost-benefit analysis. The second argument 
purports to show that commensurating and monetizing the values of the effects of regula-
tion is warranted because it corrects for the use of widely diverging values of a statistical 
life. This argument fails because the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life is not 
a cognitive error: It is neither precluded by considerations of instrumental rationality, nor 
by the requirement of treating like cases alike. 
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1. Introduction 
For1 many of us, a moment’s self-reflection would reveal that we are far from perfect when 
it comes to reasoning about probabilities, uncertainties and risk. In recent decades, cognitive 
psychologists, behavioural economists and others have corroborated this by providing evi-
dence for the existence of a large number of systematic biases in people’s thinking. Most of 
this work has had the descriptive aim of understanding how people in fact make judgments 
and decisions where risk is involved. But more recently, some have begun to draw explicitly 
normative conclusions from the psychological findings. One such conclusion is that society 
should regulate putatively risky activities on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, in order to 
avoid the negative influence of biases on risk regulation. The most prominent proponent of 
this ‘cognitive argument’ for cost-benefit analysis is Cass Sunstein. Over the last 15 years, 
Sunstein has articulated this argument in a number of writings (Sunstein, 2000; 2002; 2005; 
2013, Ch. 7; 2014, Ch. 6-7). Focussing on Sunstein’s account, I will argue that this cognitive 
argument fails, since the aim of avoiding cognitive error only gives us reason to instate one 
aspect of cost-benefit analysis – an aspect that is not specific to cost-benefit analysis nor 
necessitates the instatement of other aspects.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2 I present Sunstein’s argument and the 
evidence of cognitive biases he relies on. In section 3 I argue that we should make distinc-
tions between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis as well as between different sup-
posed cognitive errors. The upshot is that there are two cognitive arguments: One shows 
that the aim of correcting false beliefs about the magnitude of risks and neglect of the costs of regu-
lations provide a reason for implementing the analysis aspect of cost-benefit analysis, and the 
other shows that the aim of correcting divergences in the valuation of statistical lives provide a 
                                                          
1 I thank Sune Holm, members of the University of Copenhagen Analytic Philosophy Colloquium and 
two anonymous reviewers for helpful and quality-enhancing comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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reason for implementing the commensuration and monetization aspects of cost-benefit analy-
sis. In section 4, I then argue that the former does not amount to an argument for cost-
benefit analysis tout court, while in section 5 I argue that the latter argument fails because 
diverging valuations of statistical lives is not a cognitive error. 
 
2. Cost-benefit analysis and psychological bias 
The crux of Sunstein’s argument is this: (i) A series of cognitive biases affect our thinking 
about risk; (ii) cost-benefit analysis (henceforth CBA) corrects for these; and (iii) this proper-
ty of CBA gives us a reason to give CBA a very prominent role in the regulation of risk. In 
this section I will elaborate this claim by presenting in a little more detail the psychological 
claims Sunstein makes and the evidence that supports them.  
First, however, it is necessary to briefly define CBA (I will discuss the content of CBA 
in more detail below). Generally speaking, CBA includes an analysis of the different posi-
tive and negative effects of some policy intervention, such as a regulation aimed to curtail 
some risk. A monetary value is assigned to each component effect, such as health effects, 
price increases, ecosystem degradation, and so on. These monetary values are drawn from 
the amounts people are willing to pay for the goods in question, or the amounts they re-
quire to be paid to accept some bad effect – ideally from market prices. Where no market 
prices exist, values are extrapolated from relevant market data. Where that is also impossi-
ble, survey studies are used. Common to all valuation methods in use is that they use val-
ues of constituent costs and benefits drawn from other contexts than the case under regula-
tory consideration. 
Sunstein’s cognitive argument stresses how CBA “corrects” cognitive biases. When 
discussing cognitive biases, we can distinguish between the psychological mechanism or 
tendency and the error to which it gives rise. The important thing for a cognitive argument 
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for CBA, of course, is that CBA corrects the errors. The various psychological mechanisms 
Sunstein discusses give rise to three types of error, namely false beliefs about the magnitude 
of risks, neglect of the costs of regulation, and divergences in the valuation of risks. While 
the psychological mechanisms involved may overlap and are interconnected in various 
ways, the three types of error they give rise to represent fundamentally different problems 
for our thinking about risk and its regulation. 
 
2.1 False beliefs about the magnitude of risks 
A risk can be understood as a combination of some bad outcome that might occur and the 
likelihood or probability that this outcome does occur. For example, a certain level of expo-
sure to some substance might entail a 1-in-10,000 chance of developing a fatal cancer. Focus-
sing, as Sunstein does, on the bad of premature death, the magnitude of a risk is equivalent 
to the likelihood of premature death, and, when summed over a population, to the expected 
annual number of fatalities. Sunstein suggests that several cognitive mechanisms lead peo-
ple to form systematically wrong beliefs about the magnitude of various risks: People judge 
the likelihood of event-types (e.g. death from tuberculosis) on the basis of the cognitive 
availability of instances of the type (Sunstein, 2002, pp. 33-35; 2005, pp. 36-39); mechanisms 
of social transmission of information tend to amplify already erroneous beliefs about the 
magnitude of various risks; and various simplistic emotion-driven mechanisms influence 
judgment.  
The result is a number of systematic errors in people’s beliefs about the magnitude of 
risks. People overestimate the probability of low frequency events and underestimate the 
probability of high frequency events. They overestimate the number of fatalities from high-
ly publicized and emotionally salient causes, such as accidents or cancer, and underestimate 
fatalities from “undramatic, quiet killers”, such as diabetes (Liechtenstein et al., 1978). Risks 
 5 
from activities that people view as highly beneficial, such as cell phone use, are underesti-
mated, while risks from activities seen as being without benefits, such as GM agriculture, 
are overestimated. And when judging acts with a possible high-affect outcome, such as 
dying in a plane crash, the probability is sometimes neglected altogether. 
 The general effect of all of the mechanisms described above is that people’s beliefs 
about the magnitude of risks caused by different activities and phenomena are systematical-
ly wrong. CBA corrects this by highlighting the actual magnitude of various risks, as well as 
by showing precisely how much risk-reduction a given policy would achieve.  
 
2.2 Neglecting the costs of regulation 
The activities that produce risks typically also have benefits. According to Sunstein, ordi-
nary people tend to neglect these benefits when they evaluate risky activities. Since the costs 
of regulation are partly the mirror image of the benefits of the regulated activity, this means 
that people tend to neglect some costs of regulation. One cause of cost neglect is people’s 
tendency to perceive risky activities as having few benefits (and hence regulating them to 
have few costs). Another cause is loss aversion. Since people dislike losses more than they 
like corresponding gains, they tend to focus on possible losses – i.e. risks – and neglect the 
benefits that are foregone by regulating. Furthermore, there is a tendency to judge losses 
and gains relative to the status quo, leading to a higher tolerance for existing risks than new 
ones. Finally, the systemic side effects of trying to remove a risk are often ignored. In many 
cases, regulations will create “substitute risks” – for example, banning asbestos in car brakes 
may increase the risk of brake failure. Such “risk-risk tradeoffs” are often ignored (Sunstein, 
2002, pp. 39-40; 2005, pp. 32-33). 
 For these reasons, Sunstein argues, there is a tendency for people to ignore the costs 
of regulatory policies. As he puts it, the benefits of regulation are “on-screen” while the 
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costs are “off-screen”. Some studies suggest that merely placing costs on-screen leads people 
to alter their judgments (Sunstein 2002, p. 42; 2005, p. 48). CBA corrects cost neglect because 
all effects of regulation, costs as well as benefits, are present on CBA’s screen. 
 
2.3 Diverging valuation of risks 
The final cognitive error that Sunstein identifies is the assignment of (widely) diverging 
monetary values to reducing risks that are statistically expected to claim the same number 
of lives – or, equivalently, assigning (widely) diverging monetary values to a ‘statistical life’. 
Sunstein clearly takes diverging valuations to be a major problem: In the two places where 
he deals exclusively with the cognitive argument for CBA, he begins by discussing a study 
showing that the cost per premature death averted for a large set of regulations varied from 
$0.1 million to $92 billion (Sunstein, 2000, pp. 1061-1064; Sunstein, 2002, pp. 29-33). The fact 
of divergence is thus the primary datum that motivates a closer scrutiny of risk regulation 
practices. Furthermore, Sunstein describes the divergences uncovered as “anomalies” and 
claims that they are, at least in part, caused by irrationalities (Sunstein, 2002, pp. 48-49). In 
addition, Sunstein suggests that (widely) diverging valuations of statistical lives are marks 
of a system of regulation that is not “coherent” (Sunstein, 2005, p. 149).  
 Diverging valuations is less obviously a cognitive error than the two categories 
above. Sunstein gives two reasons for believing that diverging valuations are nevertheless 
problematic. First, the assignment of diverging values to saving a statistical life “creates a 
presumption that a system of regulation suffers from serious misallocation of resources” 
(Sunstein, 2002, p. 31). In other words, a regulatory system that assigns widely diverging 
monetary values to statistical lives is using available resources unwisely, and could do more 
good by reallocating resources to make the valuations of statistical lives roughly the same 
across cases. Sunstein cites a study that suggests that reallocating resources in this manner 
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could save an additional 60.000 lives annually (holding cost constant), or save $31 billion, 
(holding lives saved constant) (Sunstein, 2002, p. 25; the study cited is Tengs & Graham, 
1996). Second, he appeals to the uncontroversial principle that like cases should be treated 
alike to argue that the value of reducing one risk should only be different from the value of 
reducing another risk if there is a morally salient difference from one case to another (Sun-
stein, 2002, p. 48; 2005, p. 149; Sunstein, Kahneman, Shkade & Ritov, 2002, p. 1153).  
All of the abovementioned psychological effects can generate diverging valuations. In 
addition, divergences are caused by two further phenomena. The first is what Sunstein calls 
“the proportionality effect”, which denotes a preference for saving a larger proportion of 
people in the reference class rather than saving a larger absolute number (Sunstein, 2002, 
pp. 47-48). For example, many would prefer to save the people living in a village of 100 
from a 1-in-20 risk of death to saving the people of a city of 10,000,000 from a 1-in-1,000,000 
risk of death, although the latter act is expected to save more people (10 rather than 5 statis-
tical lives). Consequently the amount of resources devoted per statistical life saved is likely 
to be higher for small populations facing a somewhat higher probability of death than for 
larger populations facing a somewhat lower probability of death. The second is “separate 
evaluation”, which occurs when one policy is evaluated without reference to other policies. 
In a study, Sunstein and co-authors found that people’s judgments concerning the value of 
providing two different benefits changed markedly when these benefits were assessed joint-
ly rather than separately (Sunstein, Kahneman, Shkade & Ritov, 2002, pp. 1174-1178). Such 
“joint evaluation” is, of course, characteristic of the coherentist methods that are dominant 
within moral epistemology. 
 According to Sunstein, CBA provides a corrective for the diverging valuations prob-
lem in three ways. First, it provides information about how many lives are saved and at 
what cost, and thereby prevents divergence from emerging from unreflective processes. 
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Second, it directly prevents separate evaluation by using evaluation methods that make 
references to other cases than the one being treated. Third, CBA directly limits divergence 
by institutionalizing a presumptive value for a statistical life that holds across cases.  
 
3. Evaluating the cognitive argument 
Just as we can distinguish between three types of cognitive error, we can distinguish be-
tween three aspects of CBA, which I dub analysis, commensuration and monetization. Drawing 
these distinctions reveals a more complex picture behind the claim that CBA corrects cogni-
tive errors: We should ask which aspects of CBA corrects for which errors. The three aspects of 
CBA are as follows: 
Analysis is an assessment of the likely effects of the various available policy alterna-
tives – how many lives would be saved, what other health problems would be avoided, 
which ecosystems would be preserved, how much would it cost industry to implement, etc. 
Analysis provides an accounting of the effects using measures that are ‘natural’ for the giv-
en kind of effect. 
Commensuration is the assignment of values to the various effects that allow a compar-
ison of the values of different things (e.g. lives saved and industry costs) – or, equivalently, 
that allow us to talk of the relative values of these different things. Commensuration is nec-
essary for generating meaningful sums of benefits and costs. Importantly, the type of com-
mensuration that is part of CBA assigns values to constituent costs and benefits that are sup-
posed to apply across cases.  
Monetization denotes the use of money as the metric that allows commensuration. The 
standard method for generating monetized values is by estimating ordinary people’s will-
ingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WTA). That is, the analyst estimates how 
much people are willing to pay in order to avoid, for example, a certain risk of death or the 
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destruction of an ecosystem (WTP), or alternatively how much they would need to be paid 
in order to allow themselves to be subjected to a certain risk, or to allow an ecosystem to be 
destroyed (WTA). Where the thing in question is not directly traded in a market, WTP/WTA 
is extrapolated from relevant market behaviour – especially wage premiums for risky occu-
pations where mortality risks are concerned – or estimated on the basis of surveys.  
Now, in virtue of which of these aspects does CBA correct which of the cognitive er-
rors? Consider first false beliefs about the magnitude of risks. This error is solved through 
analysis, since that aspect provides a full assessment of the likely effects of regulation. This 
includes risk information in terms of the probabilities of adverse effects, the number of peo-
ple bearing each type of risk, and/or the aggregated expected number of deaths caused or 
prevented by regulation. It is not necessary to translate risk numbers into any other value in 
order to get them right; arguably, such translation is more likely to distort the information. 
Second, consider neglect of the costs of regulation. Again, this error is prevented by analy-
sis, which includes an assessment of all effects of regulation, including costs. It is not neces-
sary to commensurate costs with benefits in order to bring them “on-screen”. Finally, con-
sider diverging valuations of risks. Here, analysis is not sufficient, since it does not even 
provide numbers that allow comparisons of diverging valuations across cases. Hence com-
mensuration and monetization are needed to avoid diverging valuations. 
The upshot is that there really are two cognitive arguments: The first argument says 
that false beliefs and cost neglect are cognitive errors, and that the fact that analysis corrects 
those errors provides a reason for using analysis. The second argument says that diverging 
valuations is a cognitive error, and that the fact that commensuration and monetization 
corrects that error provides a reason for using commensuration and monetization. In the 
next two sections, I will argue that neither of these arguments succeeds in providing a co-
gent cognitive argument for CBA.  
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4. Is the argument for analysis an argument for CBA? 
Why might one think that an argument for one aspect of CBA counts as an argument for 
CBA as a whole? I can think of two reasons. First, one might simply identify CBA with analy-
sis. This would represent a divergence from what is standardly meant by CBA (although 
not one that is entirely unheard of (Adler & Posner, 2006, p. 79)). If one were to make an 
argument of this sort, one ought to flag strongly that the sense of ‘cost-benefit analysis’ used 
is non-standard, and avoid intermingling the argument with discussions of commensura-
tion and monetization. Sunstein does neither of these things. However, he does frequently 
describe CBA as being a mere account of all effects of the regulations considered, and as no 
more than an informational input that does not constrain decisions, both of which sound 
more like analysis only than full CBA (e.g. Sunstein, 2002, pp. 35 & 106-110; Sunstein, 2005, 
p. 129).  
If this is what Sunstein means by ‘the cognitive argument for CBA’, that argument is 
of course sound. But I do not think this is in fact what Sunstein means. The conclusion he 
draws from considering cognitive biases is that there should be an “incompletely theorized 
agreement” among proponents of all or most plausible normative outlooks on eight con-
crete proposals to be implemented in legal and administrative practice (Sunstein, 2002, p. 
110-113). The implementation of these eight proposals would, taken together, amount to the 
implementation of all three aspects of CBA, including commensuration and monetization. 
Under Sunstein’s scheme, agencies charged with risk regulation would be required to show 
that the benefits outweigh the costs before being allowed to implement the regulation. Fur-
thermore, agencies would be required to monetize all effects and to use a value of a statisti-
cal life (henceforth VSL) that falls within a set range (Sunstein, 2002, p. 111-112; 2014, ch. 2). 
The current recommended range is a floor of $1 million and a ceiling of $10 million (Sun-
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stein, 2014, p. 204, n. 12). This interval is based on studies intended to measure people’s 
willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept – i.e. they are the standard CBA value measures 
(Sunstein, 2005, ch. 6; 2014, p. 51). In conjunction, these requirements entail that a regulation 
is only acceptable if its benefits outweigh its costs, where costs and benefits are monetized 
in the manner characteristic of CBA. In other words, they implement full CBA in a way that 
constrains decisions.  
However, it should be noted that the CBA advocated by Sunstein is a soft, non-rigid 
form. Both the requirement to show that benefits justify costs and the VSL interval are pre-
sumptive only. It would be possible for regulative agencies to go ahead with regulations 
whose costs exceed their benefits “on the basis of a publicly articulated explanation”, e.g. in 
court, or in response to regulatory review (Sunstein, 2002, p. 112). Agencies would likewise 
be allowed to use a VSL outside the set interval if they can provide a reasoned explanation. 
In particular, agencies should be allowed to adjust the VSL in accordance with various 
“qualitative factors”. These presumptions make it unclear what the effects of Sunstein’s 
proposals would be. Much would be left to the discretion of judges and civil servants. Nev-
ertheless, his proposals would certainly do more than merely implement analysis. 
The second possible reason for thinking that the cognitive argument for analysis is a 
cognitive argument for CBA is to take the fact that one aspect of CBA possesses a reason-
giving feature to provide a reason for implementing CBA as a whole. The general principle 
is not unfamiliar: The durability of the engine provides a reason to buy the entire car, and 
the deliciousness of the dessert provides a reason to buy the whole tasting menu. Since the 
analysis aspect possesses the reason-giving property of correcting false belief and cost ne-
glect, it would not be strange to say that there is a (cognitive) reason for using CBA. How-
ever, it would be strange to claim that the properties of one aspect of a whole provide reason 
for favouring other aspects of that whole, e.g. that the engine’s durability counts in favour 
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of the car’s leather interior, or that the fact that the tasting menu’s dessert is delicious pro-
vides a reason to buy that menu’s entree from the à la carte selection. Similarly the desirable 
qualities of analysis provide no reason for using commensuration or monetization.  
There is thus some basis for saying that the cognitive argument for analysis is a cog-
nitive argument for CBA. However, it is a limited argument, in two ways. First, it does not 
provide a reason for implementing commensuration and monetization when we are consid-
ering whether to implement aspects individually. In the case of Sunstein’s eight proposi-
tions, there seems to me no good reason to suppose that they cannot be implemented sepa-
rately. Consequently, no incompletely theorized agreement can be expected on those prop-
ositions that implement commensuration and monetization. 
Second, if the cognitive argument for CBA is at bottom an argument for analysis only, 
then no reason has been given for preferring CBA to any alternative that also includes analy-
sis. Consequently we have been given no reason for preferring CBA to alternatives that 
already include analysis, or for merely reforming alternatives that do not include analysis 
but are compatible with it. Many of CBA’s primary rivals already include analysis. Consid-
er, for example, what Adler & Posner (2006, p. 73) call the “intuitive balancing” approach, 
which they claim is widely used. Under this approach “policy effects will be described, 
and indeed might be quantified on various scales (for example, numbers of deaths, acres of 
ecosystem destroyed, jobs lost or gained)”. This is exactly what analysis is. However, the 
intuitive balancing approach does not commensurate or monetize, but weighs the costs and 
benefits in given case in an intuitive manner. 
Another widely used approach is technology-based regulation (Driesen, 2005; 2011; 
McGarity, 2002, p. 2343-2344). Under this approach, agencies operate with two aims: One is 
an ideal but non-enforceable state wherein no harm is expected to occur; for example, a 
level of exposure to a toxin that is known not to be harmful. The second is a non-ideal, but 
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enforceable goal, that requires risk producers the move as close to the ideal goal as is tech-
nologically feasible; for example, to reduce emissions of the toxin so as to bring exposure as 
close to the safe level as possible. ‘Feasibility’ here means both that the given limit to risk 
must literally be technically possible and that it must be economically possible for the in-
dustry regulated. An economically impossible regulation is typically taken to be a regula-
tion that makes it impossible for large sections of the relevant industry to continue operat-
ing (Driesen, 2005, p. 9). Technology-based regulation thus includes an analysis of risks – 
required for setting the ideal goal – as well as an analysis of costs. But it neither commensu-
rates nor monetizes effects.  
I conclude, therefore, that the route to a successful cognitive argument for CBA 
through the (assumed) successful cognitive argument for analysis fails, since it does not 
provide a reason for implementing CBA as a whole where analysis is available on its own, 
and since it does not provide a reason to prefer CBA to most important rivals. It does, of 
course, provide a reason to prefer CBA to alternatives that do not include analysis, such as 
directly and uncritically responding to public demands for regulation. But it is misleading 
call this a cognitive argument for CBA when it is in fact equally an argument for a number of 
plausible alternatives.  
 
5. Diverging valuation and cognitive error 
Although the route to a cognitive argument for CBA through the argument for analysis 
fails, the route through the argument against diverging valuations may yet succeed. Follow-
ing Sunstein, I will only discuss the valuation of statistical lives. If diverging VSLs are a 
cognitive error, and if commensuration and monetization corrects that error, then there is a 
cognitive argument for commensuration and monetization. In conjunction with the cogni-
tive argument for analysis, this would amount to a cognitive argument for CBA as a whole. 
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Although diverging VSLs is less obviously a cognitive error than false beliefs and cost ne-
glect, I suggested earlier that there are two kinds of reason for thinking that it is: First, that 
diverging VSLs amount to a suboptimal allocation of resources, and second, that using di-
verging VSLs means treating similar cases differently. Call the first instrumental reasons and 
the second coherence reasons. I will now argue that neither of these types of reason succeeds 
in showing that diverging valuation is a cognitive error that can be corrected by commensu-
ration and monetization. 
 
5.1 Instrumental reasons 
Assume that all we care about is saving as many lives as possible. Then any approach that 
results in fewer lives than possible being saved is instrumentally irrational. Sunstein argues 
that current (or rather pre-CBA era) regulatory policy suffers from exactly that instrumental 
irrationality. As mentioned, he frequently refers to a table showing widely diverging VSLs, 
and suggests that large benefits could be realized by reallocation. The numbers in that table 
are somewhat old, not to mention controversial (Heinzerling 1998; Parker 2003). As a more 
recent figure, Sunstein cites calculations by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
showing an increase in net benefits from regulation from $3.4 billion annually to $91.3 bil-
lion during the first three years of the Obama administration, when CBA was widely im-
plemented under Sunstein’s own direction (OMB, 2012, p. 59; Sunstein, 2013, pp. 33-35). 
 These claims of waste before and improvement after CBA was used can certainly be 
questioned. With respect to the latter, there is a measure of question begging involved, since 
the calculations made by the OMB are based on monetized costs and benefits as recom-
mended in CBA. It is not surprising that a policy aimed at maximizing CBA-defined net 
benefits in fact increase CBA-defined net benefits. But this cannot be used as a neutral meas-
ure of how much good is done by using CBA. 
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With respect to the former, the mere fact that some regulations spend smaller sums 
per statistical life saved than others is not sufficient to show that more lives could be saved. 
First of all, what matters is not actual expenditure per life saved, but the marginal cost of 
saving an extra life for each regulation. There is no general reason to think that actual ex-
penditure is a good indicator of the marginal cost of an extra life saved: Some regulations 
may have succeeded in eliminating mortality risk altogether, leaving no extra lives available 
to be saved; or the potential of one relatively cheap method of reducing risk may have been 
reached, and any alternative method, e.g. banning the activity altogether, may be much 
more expensive.2 Second of all, the savings from deregulating cannot always be reallocated 
to other, cheaper-per-life-saved regulations. In many cases, the savings associated with de-
regulating accrue to various private actors (e.g. businesses, workers or consumers). Such 
savings are not immediately available for reallocation, although they could in principle be 
made available, e.g. by taxing risk production.  
Suppose, however, that we could in fact save more lives at the same cost by reallocat-
ing our regulatory efforts. This fact alone still does not warrant the use of a full CBA that 
monetizes the value of lives saved. Suppose we were to hold current expenditure fixed and 
then go about saving lives in the most cost-efficient way. In that case, the VSL would be 
determined by what the cost of saving the final life we could afford to save is. There would 
be no need to determine the VSL by any external method, such as WTP/WTA.  
The effect of using an externally determined VSL is to implicitly set our total risk re-
duction ‘budget’ – the total expenditure we would incur by saving all lives that could be 
saved at less than $X each. There is an allocation-based rationale for using the externally 
                                                          
2 The study by Tengs and Graham cited by Sunstein does take the marginal cost issue into account by 
using numbers for the “level of implementation” of various interventions. However, those numbers 
are estimates by anonymous reviewers, and there is no publically available information about what 
their basis is (Parker 2003: 1362-1363, 1377-1381). 
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determined VSL, but it has to do with what other goods we could get instead of lives saved, 
rather than with how many lives we could save at a given cost. Only if the externally de-
termined VSL captures a value ratio between risk reduction and everything else that is (in 
some sense) correct is it instrumentally irrational to spend more than the externally deter-
mined VSL on saving a statistical life (since we are getting less overall good than we could 
have gotten via an alternative allocation of resources).  
 
5.2 Coherence reasons  
Even if diverging VSLs is not evidence for misallocation, they may still be indefensible for 
coherence reasons. Sunstein argues that diverging VSLs are evidence of a lack of coherence 
in our regulatory system (Sunstein, 2005, p. 149). In other words, they are evidence that we 
are arbitrarily treating cases differently. He also suggests that CBA avoids such incoherence 
because it implements the coherentist method: Since the VSL used in CBA that is imported 
from a different case than the one under consideration, it is a form of joint, rather than sepa-
rate, evaluation. Prima facie, this idea is plausible. CBA is at least not guilty of conducting a 
separate evaluation of the regulatory case under scrutiny. But no joint evaluation is at work 
either. Rather, the VSL is typically extracted from a single (type of) case, namely the wage 
premiums workers receive for taking jobs that include mortality risks. The ‘comparison’ 
between wage premium cases and regulation cases is entirely one way – no argument is 
ever made that wage premiums are too high, or too low, based on feedback from other cas-
es. CBA thus substitutes separate evaluation of one case for separate evaluation of another 
case. It is not a coherentist method.  
 Although CBA is not a coherentist method, we might still suspect that diverging 
VSLs reveal arbitrarily differential treatment of cases. This idea, too, has some prima facie 
appeal. If we are spending $1 million to save a life in the domain of workplace accidents but 
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$20 million in the domain of air traffic, it seems that we are valuing the lives of workers at 
only one twentieth of the lives of air travellers. But this is only true if the VSL in some sense 
measures the moral importance we are attaching to each person’s life. It need not do so. 
There is an ambiguity in the expression ‘the value of a statistical life’. In one sense, the VSL 
refers to an input into a decision procedure that assigns a value to constituent effects of reg-
ulation and makes a decision on the basis of the balance of values (i.e. a decision procedure 
that commensurates). Call this an input VSL. In the other sense, the VSL is simply an ac-
counting consequence of a regulation that is based on a rationale that does not employ a 
(monetized) input VSL: If the cost of the regulation is $100 million and it saves 10 statistical 
lives, then the VSL of that regulation is $10 million. Call this a revealed VSL. Only where the 
decision procedure employs a monetary input VSL can the monetary VSL be said to meas-
ure the moral importance being placed on the statistical lives that are at stake. Thus it is 
only in those cases that diverging VSLs can be said to constitute diverging moral valuations 
of lives. But not all reasonable rationales for regulation use a monetized input VSL. They 
may use a non-monetized input VSL, or use inputs other than VSL, or not use inputs at all. 
The way Sunstein sets up his argument blurs the distinction between input VSL and 
revealed VSL. He proposes that regulatory agencies should be required to produce a CBA. In 
other words, they are required to produce an argument for regulation framed in the terms 
of the regulatory rationale of CBA – i.e. a rationale that commensurates, takes VSL as one of 
the inputs, and that monetizes this input VSL. If this is a requirement that only a CBA-style 
regulatory rationale is eligible, Sunstein’s argument is viciously circular. But suppose agen-
cies were allowed to base their decision on another type of rationale – one that uses non-
monetized input VSL, or uses inputs other than VSL, or does not use inputs at all – but were 
still required to produce a CBA inclusive of a monetary VSL. In that case, the monetary VSL 
‘used’ by agencies is a revealed VSL, not an input VSL. Hence the fact that agencies use 
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diverging monetary VSLs do not give us reason to think that they are assigning different 
moral importance to different people’s lives. 
 The claim that diverging VSLs constitute a cognitive error is, therefore, unwarranted 
if non-CBA rationales for regulation are reasonable. Below I will argue that they are. Alt-
hough I will perhaps also be insinuating that they are more reasonable than the CBA ra-
tionale, this is not a necessary part of my argument against the cognitive argument for CBA. 
Since the cognitive argument for CBA requires that there could be an incompletely theo-
rized agreement on a legally binding (although presumptive) interval for the VSL, it is suffi-
cient to show that plausible standpoints do not agree that there is a problem to be solved at 
all, and/or that a mandated interval of monetized VSLs is the solution to what problems 
might exist.  
 
5.2.1 No inputs 
Some rationales for regulation do not use inputs; i.e. they do not assign values to the con-
stituent effects of regulation that are assumed to be applicable across all cases. On the intui-
tive balancing approach, for example, regulators judge whether the benefits of a proposed 
regulation taken as a whole outweigh the costs taken as a whole. They thus do not neces-
sarily assign a value to constituent costs, and the weighing will be case-specific. And in 
technology-based regulation, no inputs are used at all, since regulation is simply deter-
mined by what the highest feasible level of protection from risks is.  
These rationales for regulation are rationalized by forms of non-consequentialist the-
ory. Many non-consequentialists argue that aggregation – i.e. weighing costs against bene-
fits – is not permitted in cases where the members of one group stand to get a minor benefit 
while the members of the other group stand to get a major benefit (e.g. Scanlon, 1998, pp. 
235-236). Now, suppose group A will bear the costs of a regulation while group B will bene-
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fit (by being relieved of bearing a risk). If the cost to each member of A is trivial compared 
with the risk that the members of B will otherwise bear, then on a non-consequentialist view 
we should help B – that is, implement the regulation – even if the aggregate benefits to 
group A are larger (see Lenman, 2008; James, 2012; Frick, 2015). These non-consequentialists 
thus focus on the trade-off made in a given case instead of the values of each constituent 
effect considered independently. 
  From the point of view of non-consequentialist theories of this kind, both intuitive 
balancing and technology-based regulation make a lot of sense. Since the trade-offs made in 
each case are what matters, any balancing of costs and benefits should be expected to be 
case-specific, as it is in intuitive balancing. And technology-based reasoning can be viewed 
as the implementation of a specific set of allowable trade-offs: Predictable deaths are not to 
be traded off against mere economic loss to a risk-producing industry, but predictable 
deaths can be traded off against the costs associated with undermining the industry’s ability 
to operate.  
 
5.2.2 Non-VSL inputs 
Even if we accept that a commensurating decision procedure is the best one, it is an open 
question what inputs we should use in such a procedure – or, in other words, what the 
morally important constituent effects of regulation are. If the inputs used by regulators are 
not VSLs, then the revealed VSL of regulation may vary. And a number of plausible posi-
tions in ethics imply that the VSL is not the relevant input. For example, on the standard 
account, the badness of a death is proportional to the life span lost (see e.g. McMahan, 2002, 
ch. 2; Nagel, 1970). For those holding such a view, the relevant input to decision-making 
should not be statistical lives lost, but statistical life years lost. Consequently, the revealed 
VSL of interventions that save younger people should (ceteris paribus) be higher than the 
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revealed VSL of interventions that save old people. Another example is the type of death 
involved. For instance, it is plausible to hold that a death resulting from a long and painful 
illness, such as cancer, is worse than instantaneous death from a workplace accident. If reg-
ulators use types of death as input, the revealed VSL for interventions that prevent diseases 
like cancer will be higher than the revealed VSL for interventions that prevent workplace 
accidents. 
 Sunstein is well attuned to this problem, and in fact he believes that the VSL is the not 
important input (Sunstein, 2004; 2014, ch. 4). Instead, the input he recommends is the “val-
ues ordinary people assign to risks” – i.e., their WTP/WTA (Sunstein, 2005, p. 131). This 
raises the question of why Sunstein believes that widely diverging VSLs is a cognitive error 
that needs to be controlled by a legally mandated VSL interval. The answer is that it is be-
cause WTP falls within such an interval. Sunstein claims that the VSL interval currently 
used by the U.S. government is congruent with “the range suggested by the current tech-
nical literature”, where this technical literature consists of WTP studies (Sunstein, 2014, p. 
51). Furthermore, the cases in which he envisages the presumptive interval to be overridden 
are cases where studies suggest WTPs are markedly different, e.g. in the case of cancer 
deaths (Sunstein, 2005, pp. 139-141).  
 However, not all reasonable views would agree with Sunstein on this. First of all, the 
view that WTP is the correct input is controversial. Second, and more importantly, Sun-
stein’s assumption that WTP falls within a relatively narrow interval relies on the rejection 
of some of the variation in WTP that have been observed (Sunstein, 2002, Ch. 3; 2005, Ch. 7).  
In particular, he disregards two important differences between risk cases, namely voluntari-
ness and the distribution of risks and the benefits from the risk’s existence. These factors alter 
ordinary people’s assessments of risk drastically (Slovic, 2000). Furthermore, and more im-
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portantly, giving proper weight to these factors cast doubt on the justifiability of using a 
relatively narrow VSL interval on moral grounds. 
Consider first voluntariness. When considering the different values of a risk that is 
borne voluntarily and one that is not we must consider the importance of a number of phe-
nomena, including freedom, consent, compensation, and personal responsibility. Arguably, 
the proper moral role of these factors is so complex and disputed that it defies a framing in 
terms of inputs at all.3 But supposing that we can frame the issue in terms of inputs, there is 
no reason to expect the value of a voluntary risk of death (e.g. from skydiving) and a non-
voluntary risk of death (e.g. from air pollution) to be even roughly the same, even if the 
probabilities of death are the same. 
 Second, consider distributions of the risks and benefits from the risk’s existence (see 
Hermansson & Hansson, 2007). There are two very simple kinds of case and a range of un-
simple ones. In one kind of simple case, the beneficiaries of regulation also bear the entire 
cost. Call these Type A cases. In the other, the opposite is true; the beneficiaries and the cost 
bearers are wholly distinct groups. Call these Type B cases. In between are combinations of 
the two, where different persons incur some of the cost and/or some of the benefit of a regu-
lation. For simplicity, I focus only on the simple types of case. Type A and Type B cases 
involve very different moral judgments. In Type A cases, autonomy will play a large role, 
since we are deciding on behalf of the individual what her trade-off between bearing the 
risk and enjoying the benefits of the risk-producing activity should be. In Type B cases, the 
judgment may be about how much money we, as a society, should be willing to spend to 
reduce risks, or it may be about what burdens we may legitimately place on others in order 
                                                          
3 As Sunstein rightly argues (2002, Ch. 3), voluntariness is not plausibly conceived of as an either/or 
property, but rather reflect a number of underlying factors that differ in degree. 
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to reduce a risk to a given set of persons. There is no prima facie reason to think that these 
very different judgments should yield similar results. 
 So giving appropriate moral weight voluntariness and distribution seems to militate 
against a narrow VSL interval. What is more, it suggests that WTP numbers systematically 
undervalues VSL in a large number of cases. First of all, WTP studies normally concern 
Type A cases. In Type A cases, the rationale for using WTP, rather than a higher number, is 
the plausible principle that we should not force people to make exchanges that they would 
rather have avoided (Sunstein, 2005, pp. 150-153). But this rationale is not applicable at all in 
Type B cases, where no individual is forced to make any exchange. Second, if WTP studies 
must assume that (for example) wage differentials reflect the well-informed and autono-
mous valuation workers place on risks, which implies that the risks are voluntarily borne. If 
this assumption is true, the reason for using WTP to determine the VSL in cases of involun-
tarily borne risk is undermined. And, assuming that involuntarily borne risks are worse 
than voluntarily borne ones, CBA systematically undervalues statistical lives lost due to 
involuntarily borne risks. 
 
5.2.3 Non-monetary VSL 
It is perhaps not surprising that divergence in revealed VSL follows from regulatory ration-
ales that do not use inputs or that use inputs other than VSL. But even if we assume that the 
VSL is the same across all cases, the monetary revealed VSL may still be different if the regu-
latory rationale uses a non-monetized measure of the VSL. Although monetization is fre-
quently presented as a mere pragmatic tool by CBA proponents, no alternative has been 
tried in practice (as far as I know). But consider as a contrast an approach which assigns to 
each constituent effect a set number of ‘regulatory points’, which are supposed to measures 
the moral importance of each constituent effect. Suppose also that this ‘points approach’ 
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assigns the same number of points to each statistical life. The revealed VSL of a regulation 
designed on the basis of the points approach would depend on how many points the vari-
ous costs of regulation are assigned. For example, if the moral importance of a $100 million 
price increase has a different moral importance than $100 loss to shareholders, then these 
costs would be assigned different points – and the revealed monetary VSLs of regulations 
saving equal numbers of lives per regulatory cost point would consequently differ depend-
ing on the type of cost involved. 
It is very plausible that not all costs are equally morally important. For example, 
those who bear the cost may have no claim to the good of which they will be deprived. This 
is especially true when those who bear the costs of regulation are also causally responsible 
for the existence of the risk and do not bear the risk themselves – that is, when they impose 
the risk on others for their own benefit. But more generally, there seem to me to be little 
reason to assume that a $100 million increase in taxes on leaded gasoline has the same mor-
al importance as $100 million of lost profits to farmers from a ban on a cheap but toxic pes-
ticide, and that both of these have the same moral importance as a $100 million worsening 
of the government budget balance. 
A further problem is that the use of monetary values as inputs in CBA means that ef-
fects that are ‘naturally’ measured in money are not subjected to the same scrutiny as effects 
that are not naturally counted in money, such as adverse health effects and environmental 
degradation. Consider, for example, Sunstein’s description of how 36 ideal-type cases of 
regulation would be (and presumably were) examined using CBA during the process of 
regulatory review that he administered (Sunstein, 2014, Ch. 2). No questions are posed on 
the cost side – in every case the cost is merely stated as a total aggregate dollar amount. By 
contrast, the benefits of regulation are meticulously scrutinized. At least one reason why 
CBA’s critics are often especially averse to the monetization aspect of CBA is exactly that it 
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makes the analysis blind to morally important differences on the cost side, where the ‘natu-
ral’ currency is likely to be money. In other words, the monetization step will very likely 
have the effect that morally relevant differences between costs are erased. The fact that CBA 
fails to rationally scrutinize one side of the cost-benefit equation is especially troubling for 
an argument that conceives of CBA as an engine for rational scrutiny, as the cognitive ar-
gument does. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that Sunstein’s cognitive argument fails. Closer inspection reveals that both 
‘cognitive error’ and ‘cost-benefit analysis’ are concepts that can be decomposed into differ-
ent phenomena, and that the cognitive argument for CBA is better viewed as two separate 
arguments. One argument is persuasive, but is not an argument for CBA, only for the anal-
ysis aspect of it. The other argument would provide reason to implement CBA as a whole, 
but is unpersuasive since we have neither instrumental nor coherence-based reasons to treat 
diverging valuations of statistical lives as a cognitive error. Instrumental reasons rely on the 
false (or at least unsubstantiated) assumption that reallocating resources as CBA recom-
mends would realize large gains, and they fail to justify setting the total risk-reduction 
budget at any given level. Coherence-based arguments falsely assume either that CBA is a 
coherentist method or that monetary VSLs are meaningful measures of the moral im-
portance attached to saving a life, even where monetary VSLs are merely revealed rather 
than used as inputs. Consequently, there is no cogent cognitive argument for cost-benefit 
analysis in risk regulation. 
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